What happened
On February 2, 2022 an attacker exploited a signature-verification flaw in Wormhole’s Solana contract, forged a guardian message and minted 120,000 wrapped ETH with no backing, then bridged most of it back to Ethereum (project's own account).
The bridge was paused and patched. A backing firm replenished the contract with 120,000 ETH to restore full collateral, and Wormhole offered a US$10 million bounty (project's own account).
Timeline
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| 2022-01-13 | Toolchain upgrade that happens to include the missing check is pushed to public code, pending audit (project's own account) |
| 2022-02-02 | Signature-verification bug exploited; 120,000 wrapped ETH minted |
| 2022-02-03 | Network back online after the patch |
| 2022-02-03 | Flaw closed at 00:32 UTC; Jump Crypto refills 120,000 ETH at 13:08 UTC (project's own account) |
| 2022-02-04 | Incident report published |
| 2023-02-16 | A whitehat group shows Oasis how assets tied to the exploiter's wallet could be retrieved (Oasis's own account) |
| 2023-02-21 | Oasis receives a High Court of England and Wales order and moves the assets to a court-authorized third party (Oasis's own account) |
Scale, from official records
- 120,000 wrapped ETH minted without backing (Wormhole’s own incident report, 2022-02-04)
The Canadian angle
Global reference case; no Canadian-specific angle sourced.
How did one missing check let an attacker mint 120,000 wrapped ETH?
Wormhole is a messaging network run by 19 Guardians. A message counts as genuine when more than two-thirds of them sign it. Its Portal token bridge mints a wrapped token on one chain only after it receives a Guardian-signed message saying the original was locked on the other chain (project's own account, 2022-02-04).
On Solana, the minting program relied on a function called verify_signatures. It read data from a special system account that the Solana runtime fills in, but it did not check that the account passed in was really that system account. The attacker supplied a fake one, so the function treated signatures as verified when they were not. That let the attacker forge any message aimed at Solana, including one to mint 120,000 wrapped ETH (project's own account).
The attacker sent 93,750 of the tokens back to Ethereum, redeemed them for ETH, and swapped the rest for SOL. Wormhole said a routine toolchain upgrade pushed to its public code on January 13, 2022 happened to include the missing check while it waited for audit. The attacker may have spotted the flaw in that public change (project's own account).
How fast did the bridge stop, and who refilled it?
The exploit began at 18:24 UTC on February 2, 2022. Contributors noticed the shortfall in a routine check at 19:07, and token transfers paused at 19:40 once Guardians holding about 37% of voting power stopped relaying messages. The flaw was closed at 00:32 UTC. A further upgrade at 05:53 blocked messages the attacker had already prepared (project's own account).
At 13:08 UTC on February 3, Jump Crypto put 120,000 ETH into the contract, restoring full backing, and the network came back online at 13:29. Wormhole put the incident at about 16 hours. It offered US$10 million for information leading to an arrest and conviction or to recovery of the assets, and kept open a US$10 million offer to the attacker to return the funds. Its report describes no obligation on anyone to refill the bridge (project's own account).
Did a court ever reach the stolen funds?
A year later, a court in England stepped in. Oasis, a DeFi front end, said that on February 21, 2023 it received an order from the High Court of England and Wales to take all necessary steps to retrieve certain assets linked to the wallet address tied to the Wormhole exploit. Oasis said it carried out the order using its admin multisig and a court-authorized third party, and passed the assets straight to that party's wallet (Oasis's own account, 2023-02-24).
Oasis said a whitehat group contacted it on February 16, 2023 and showed how the assets could be retrieved. That was possible only because of a previously unknown weakness in how Oasis's admin multisig access was designed. Oasis gave no amount and did not name the third party. We found no official figure, so this page does not report one.
What did Wormhole change afterwards?
Wormhole said Neodyme reviewed its code before launch in 2021, with that report published in January 2022. Three firms, Kudelski, Neodyme and Trail of Bits, were already lined up before the incident for ongoing audits. A bug bounty on Immunefi was due to launch in mid-February 2022 with a top reward of US$3.5 million (project's own account).
Wormhole's design paper for its Governor cites the February 2022 exploit as the kind of failure it is meant to limit. Each connected chain gets a US-dollar limit on how much value can leave in a 24-hour sliding window, and transfers over the limit wait in a queue. Single transfers above a set size face a fixed 24-hour delay before Guardians sign them. The paper says the Governor can only reduce the impact of an exploit, not prevent it (project's own design document).
Is there a Canadian angle?
We found no Canadian regulator, court or police proceeding about the Wormhole exploit, and no Canadian-dollar loss figure on any official page. The only court action we found was the 2023 English order described above. Wormhole's report credits Jump Crypto's refill, not any rule, fund or insurance, with restoring full backing for wrapped ETH on every chain.
Canadian securities rules set custody terms for trading platforms, not bridges. Under the CSA's pre-registration undertaking, a platform operating in Canada while it seeks registration commits to keep at least 80% of the value of clients' crypto with third-party custodians, to hold client assets in trust and apart from its own, and not to pledge or reuse them. CSA Staff Notice 21-332 (February 22, 2023) does not mention bridges or decentralized protocols.
On tax, the CRA's general folio on losses from crime says that compensation received for a stolen capital asset counts as proceeds of disposition, and that with no compensation the property is treated as disposed of on the date the loss was discovered. The folio is not written for crypto-assets.
What broke
A smart-contract bug in signature verification on one side of the bridge.
What a user could have checked
- Audit history of the deployed contracts and the size of the bug bounty.
- Who stands behind the bridge if collateral disappears: here a backer stepped in, which is not guaranteed.
- Whether the bridge publishes live figures showing that wrapped tokens in circulation match what is locked on the other chain. Wormhole spotted its gap with such a check 43 minutes after the exploit began.
- Whether the bridge caps how much value can leave in a day or delays very large transfers. Wormhole's Governor, which cites this exploit, is an example of that kind of limit.
- Your own records of wallet addresses, balances and the Canadian-dollar value of each transfer, which CRA asks crypto users to keep.
Recovery
Collateral was restored by a backing firm (project's own account).
Sources
- Wormhole incident report 02/02/22 — Wormhole (archived), 2022-02-04
Supports: 120k wETH, root cause, recapitalization, bounty (project account) · checked 2026-11-01 - Governor (whitepaper 0007) — Wormhole Foundation (GitHub)
Supports: Cites the Feb 2, 2022 exploit; per-chain USD limit over a 24h sliding window; 24h delay for large transfers; reduces impact, does not prevent (project's own design document) · checked 2026-11-01 - Statement Regarding The Transactions From The Oasis Multisig on 21st Feb 2023 — Oasis (archived), 2023-02-24
Supports: High Court of England and Wales order received Feb 21, 2023; court-authorized third party; whitehat contact Feb 16, 2023; admin multisig weakness (Oasis's own account) · checked 2026-11-01 - CSA Staff Notice 21-332 Crypto Asset Trading Platforms: Pre-Registration Undertakings — Canadian Securities Administrators, 2023-02-22
Supports: 80% third-party custody, trust and segregation, no pledging or re-use; no mention of bridges or decentralized protocols · checked 2026-11-01 - Income Tax Folio S3-F9-C1, Lottery Winnings, Miscellaneous Receipts, and Income (and Losses) from Crime — Canada Revenue Agency
Supports: Para 1.41: theft of a capital asset, compensation as proceeds, otherwise disposition on date loss discovered · checked 2026-11-01 - Keeping books and records of crypto-assets for tax filing — Canada Revenue Agency
Supports: Keep wallet addresses, CAD value of each transaction, yearly opening and closing balances · checked 2026-11-01
