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Incident · Exchange fraud · Dec 2018 – Feb 2019

QuadrigaCX: what happened and what it teaches

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Canada's largest crypto exchange failure: OSC staff found QuadrigaCX collapsed because of fraud by its CEO, who traded and spent client assets, leaving at least $169 million lost.

What happened

QuadrigaCX announced on January 14, 2019 that its CEO, Gerald Cotten, had died in India on December 9, 2018. On February 5, 2019 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court granted creditor protection and appointed Ernst & Young as Monitor; the companies were assigned into bankruptcy on April 15, 2019.

OSC staff concluded the collapse “resulted from a fraud” by Cotten, who opened accounts under aliases, credited himself with fictitious balances and traded them against clients, covering losses with other clients’ deposits. Staff said Quadriga “operated like a Ponzi scheme”.

Quadriga told clients it stored 99% of coins in cold storage. Staff found that untrue: most assets sat in hot wallets and on other platforms. Staff also found it was not the case that most losses came from keys lost at Cotten’s death, and that Quadriga most likely would have collapsed even if he had lived.

These are OSC staff findings published on June 11, 2020; they are not findings of an OSC hearing panel or a court.

Timeline

DateWhat happened
2018-12-09CEO Gerald Cotten dies in India
2019-01-14Quadriga announces his death
2019-02-05Creditor protection (CCAA); EY appointed Monitor
2019-04-11Nova Scotia court approves the move from creditor protection to bankruptcy
2019-04-15Companies assigned into bankruptcy; EY trustee
2019-05-02First meeting of creditors affirms EY as trustee
2019-06-27Court approves the trustee's claims process
2019-09-10Bankruptcy transferred to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List)
2020-06-11OSC publishes its staff review
2021-03-01Ontario court fixes crypto and US-dollar conversion rates as at April 15, 2019
2022-12-16Bitcoin starts moving out of Quadriga cold wallets whose keys were never found; the trustee says it did not start the transfers
2023-05-12Trustee declares a 13.094156% interim dividend
2026-09-25Trustee declares a second interim dividend of 3.214844 cents per dollar (16.309 cents in total)
2026-11-02Second interim dividend payments begin

Scale, from official records

  • $215 million owed to clients at the filing; $46 million recovered or identified; at least $169 million lost (OSC staff review, 2020-04-14)
  • About $115 million of the shortfall from fraudulent trading on the platform and about $28 million from unauthorized trading on external platforms (OSC staff review, 2020-04-14)
  • More than 76,000 clients owed money; data on more than 368,000 client accounts analysed (OSC staff review, 2020-04-14)

The Canadian angle

A Canadian exchange with more than 76,000 clients owed money, about 40% of them in Ontario, according to the Ontario Securities Commission. Quadriga was not registered with any securities regulator.

Which Canadian courts and regulators handled the collapse?

Three companies were involved: Quadriga Fintech Solutions Corp., Whiteside Capital Corporation and 0984750 B.C. Ltd., which did business as Quadriga CX. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court granted them creditor protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act on February 5, 2019 and named Ernst & Young Inc. (EY) as Monitor. On April 11, 2019 Justice Wood approved moving the case into bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. EY's role as trustee was affirmed at the first meeting of creditors on May 2, 2019.

On September 10, 2019 the Nova Scotia court transferred the bankruptcy to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) in Toronto, where it still sits. Court-appointed Representative Counsel, including Miller Thomson, acted for affected users. By court order, EY was allowed to hand Cotten's encrypted devices to the RCMP.

OSC Enforcement Staff announced in February 2019 that they would look into Quadriga. They chose not to bring a case before the OSC tribunal, because Cotten had died and Quadriga was bankrupt, and published a review instead. Relying on CSA Staff Notice 21-327 (January 2020), staff concluded that clients' entitlements to crypto held by Quadriga were securities or derivatives, because Quadriga kept custody and delivered assets only when a client asked to withdraw.

How did the claims process work, and how much have users been paid?

The Nova Scotia court approved the trustee's claims process on June 27, 2019. Users claimed what they were owed as of April 15, 2019, in Canadian dollars, US dollars, or six crypto assets. The trustee asked for claims by August 31, 2019, but noted the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act sets no claims bar date. Representative Counsel's view was that users were generally unsecured creditors who would share pro rata. By May 6, 2020 the trustee had received 16,959 proofs of claim.

On March 1, 2021 the Ontario court fixed conversion rates as at April 15, 2019, including $6,739.08 per bitcoin, $223.45 per ether and $1.34 per US dollar. A tax claim had to be settled before any payout. The Canada Revenue Agency found Quadriga had not reported income for its 2016 to 2018 fiscal periods. Its revised claim of $11,787,528.17 was accepted by the trustee, and it shares equally with users' unsecured claims.

The first interim dividend paid 13.094156 cents per dollar of proven claim. On September 25, 2026 the trustee declared a second interim dividend of 3.214844 cents per dollar, bringing the total to 16.309 cents and about $50 million. Payments began on November 2, 2026, against 17,823 accepted claims totalling $305,013,426.23. Each payment is reduced by the levy owed to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. The trustee says a final distribution will follow but has not given an amount.

Where did the money go, according to OSC staff?

Over 97% of Cotten's fake-asset trading ran through one alias account, "Chris Markay". In 2017 and early 2018 he credited it with single fake deposits of $100 million and $50 million. He was a party to at least 87% of bitcoin trades settled in Canadian dollars in the platform's first full year, and 35% over its life. In 2018 he claimed no Quadriga affiliate was a counterparty to any trade.

Banks grew unwilling to hold Quadriga funds, and by 2017 it relied almost exclusively on third-party payment processors. In January 2018 CIBC froze accounts tied to one processor, leaving $26 million out of reach. Those funds, released after Cotten's death, made up most of what EY later recovered. Between May 2016 and January 2018 Cotten moved about $24 million of client funds to personal accounts. A settlement with his spouse in October 2019 returned assets EY expected to be worth $12 million.

Some coins were never reachable. The trustee reported that on February 6, 2019, the day after the court order, Quadriga accidentally sent crypto to cold wallets nobody could open. On December 20, 2022 it told users that bitcoin had moved out of those wallets from December 16, 2022, and that the trustee did not start the transfers.

What changed in Canadian rules afterwards?

The CSA and IIROC published Consultation Paper 21-402 on a framework for crypto trading platforms on March 14, 2019. In January 2020, CSA Staff Notice 21-327 said a platform that keeps possession and control of clients' crypto, rather than delivering it immediately, will generally be dealing in securities or derivatives. OSC staff urged platforms to tell clients how assets are stored, what volumes are real, and whether insiders trade.

On February 22, 2023, CSA Staff Notice 21-332 strengthened the undertakings unregistered platforms must sign to keep operating while they seek registration. Platforms commit to keep client assets separate from their own and in trust, hold at least 80% of clients' crypto with third-party custodians, and let CSA staff get account information directly from those custodians. The CSA tied these changes to the 2022 platform failures, but they address the gaps OSC staff found at Quadriga: pooled assets and no outside check on holdings.

What broke

No segregation of client assets, false cold-storage claims, one person controlling everything, no books or internal controls, fictitious balances, and no registration.

What a user could have checked

  • Whether the platform was registered with a securities regulator: today, use the platform checker.
  • Whether custody arrangements were disclosed and independently verifiable.
  • Withdrawal delays: OSC staff said that in its final months Quadriga operated “like a revolving door”.
  • Whether reported trading volumes were real.
  • What a fiat deposit actually bought. Quadriga's terms of service said a client depositing cash was buying "QuadrigaCX Bucks", not holding dollars; most clients OSC staff spoke to did not know this.
  • How many people ran the company. From early 2016 Cotten was Quadriga's sole director and officer, after the CFO, legal counsel and accountants left.
  • How deposits and withdrawals were handled. By 2017 Quadriga relied almost exclusively on third-party payment processors instead of bank accounts, and $14 million of withdrawals were paid in cash by delivery.

What it meant for an ordinary holder

A client owed $10,000 at the filing
Proven claim: $10,000
First interim dividend (2023): 13.094156% → $1,309.42
Second interim dividend (paid from 2026-11-02): 3.214844% → $321.48
Total so far: 16.309% → $1,630.90 (before the bankruptcy levy)
Still unpaid: $8,369.10, pending a final distribution

Computed from the trustee's dividend rates (notices of 2023-05-12 and 2026-11-02). Claims were fixed in Canadian dollars at court-set conversion rates as at 2019-04-15, so later crypto price moves did not raise them.

Recovery

The trustee paid a first interim dividend of 13.094156 cents per dollar of proven claim (notice of May 12, 2023), declared a second interim dividend of 3.214844 cents on September 25, 2026 (16.309 cents in total, about $50 million) and began paying it on November 2, 2026. Each payment is reduced by the bankruptcy levy. The trustee says a final distribution will follow but has not given an amount.

Sources

Education only. Nothing on this page is financial, investment, tax or legal advice, or a recommendation to buy, sell, stake, lend or borrow any crypto-asset. Crypto-assets can lose some or all of their value and are not covered by CDIC. Canadian rules change: check the dated sources above and talk to a qualified professional about your situation. Full disclaimer.

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